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"[A]II agencies of the Federal Government shall... include in
every recommendation or report on proposals for.., major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement... on the environmental impact of the proposed
action ... ,
-United States Code
"And why are you anxious about clothing? Consider the lilies of
the field; they do not toil nor do they spin, yet I say to you that even
Solomon in all his glory did not clothe himself like one of these."'2
-Matthew 6:28-29
Should an agent of the federal government, about to build a new
suburban federal office complex, consider the lilies in the field that
would be destroyed by such action? After all, one can hardly call the
plowing under of one field of lilies a significant impact on the
environment.
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1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C)(i) (1988)).
2. Matthew 6:28-29
But what if the lilies in the field were more than plants or a nice
smell or a pretty picture? What if they were an earthly symbol of
divine care and protection?
How does NEPA3 treat philosophical values tied to the environ-
ment? It has not done much heretofore, leading to the statute's very
checkered and litigious history.4 Complaints about delays and costs
under NEPA are commonplace.5 The effect and use of NEPA on
large federal sales and projects (such as timber sales and dam flow-
throughs) has recently been much debated and criticized. 6 Addressing
these concerns requires a new way of thinking about NEPA. How-
ever, this new way of thinking does not require a revision of the stat-
ute itself, but in how it is interpreted and implemented. While,
pursuant to NEPA, governmental decision makers must consider sig-
nificant impacts on the environment in their decision-making process,
these decision makers have generally not considered the impact that
projects may have on the environmental values which are most impor-
tant to our society. Specifically, governmental decision-makers have
failed to consider what I will refer to as environmental philosophy and
environmental risk allocation. Primarily, this failure has resulted from
an institutional reluctance to recognize environmental philosophy and
environmental risk allocation as environmental values that should be
considered in the NEPA process.
This Article argues that environmental philosophy and environ-
mental risk allocation are real environmental values (similar to clean
air and clean water) that are affected by agency decision making.7
3. NEPA stands for the "National Environmental Policy Act." 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4347 (1988). In keeping with convention, this Article's reference to NEPA will not usually
be preceded by a definite article even if the term "National Environmental Policy Act"
itself would be.
4. Patricia M. Wald, The Bellazio Conference on US-USSR Environmental Protection
Institution: The Role of the Judiciary in Environmental Protection, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 519, 539 (1991).
5. See, e.g., FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION: LAW
AND POLICY 887-88 (2d ed. 1990) (noting criticism that NEPA requires "unnecessary
paperwork that simply delays or even eliminates useful and beneficial projects" and "self-
serving and bulky justifications for projects that agencies plan to undertake whatever the
environmental analysis reveals").
6. See Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992) (exam-
ining NEPA requirements in specific timber sales); Stark Ackerman, NEPA's Effect on
Agency Decision Making: Article: Observations on the Transformation of the Forest Ser-
vice: The Effects of the National Environmental Policy Act on U.S. Forest Service Decision
Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 703 (1990).
7. Unlike many scholars, I argue that environmental philosophy can have "value." It
may not be a direct value for human exploitation, but it has some value to humans or it
would not exist. Moreover, these values may not be easily measurable, but they can still be
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT OF THE MIND
Once recognized as environmental values, the legislative mandate of
NEPA as interpreted by the federal courts requires an analysis of the
impact of a federal action on the values of environmental philosophy
and environmental risk allocation.
A NEPA analysis that focuses on environmental philosophy and
environmental risk allocation will provide agency decision makers
with better information about the true environmental impacts of deci-
sions they undertake. The NEPA process that results should be more
efficient, thus, eliminating much delay and cost. By understanding
and incorporating these environmental values, the cost benefit analy-
sis undertaken by agency decision makers will more accurately reflect
the environmental concerns of society, making for both a more honest
and more efficient evaluation process. In Part II, I discuss the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act generally and specifically examine
the definition and scope of its requirement to analyze significant im-
pacts on environmental values. In Parts III and IV, I review litera-
ture, philosophy, and environmental laws in order to show that
environmental philosophy and environmental risk allocation are envi-
ronmental v~alues. In Part V, I show that once environmental philoso-
phy and environmental risk allocation are recognized as values, case
law requires that they be analyzed in the NEPA process; and in Part
VI, I demonstrate why such a recognition would be beneficial from a
public policy standpoint. Last, in Part VII, I examine how the incor-
poration of these values would alter NEPA analysis in a particular
case.
H. What Is an Environmental Impact Under NEPA?
Under NEPA, Congress requires all agencies to consider the en-
vironmental impact of any federal action that significantly affects the
quality of the environment.8 Federal actions include federally spon-
sored projects, projects that are federally funded, and private projects
that require federal approval or the granting of a federal permit in
order to be completed.9 Presumably, a consideration of the environ-
used in a cost/benefit decision-making context. In From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem,
1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 337,347 (1986) [hereinafter Plastic Trees], author Daniel Farber iden-
tifies environmental philosophy as an environmental value having weight aside from
"human values," although the philosophy must have some "human value" or it would not
be held as a philosophy.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
9. For a discussion of the limits of what constitutes federal action, see William B.
Ellis & Turner T. Smith, The Limits of Federal Responsibility and Control Under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 18 EtvrL,. L. 10055 (1988).
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mental impacts of a project strengthens the information on environ-
mental costs needed to do a cost benefit analysis of the project.' 0
According to the statute, its accompanying regulations, and inter-
pretive case law, environmental impacts are to be considered through
a process of listing and examining the impacts, and then examining
alternative actions that may lessen the impacts." In practice, the first
step in this process is a preliminary analysis to determine whether sig-
nificant impacts on the environment are likely to occur from a govern-
ment action, and thus whether a document must be prepared to list
and analyze those impacts and consider action alternatives.' 2 To ac-
complish this, an agency will prepare an environmental assessment,
which analyzes the possibility of significant environmental impacts.13
If, at the preliminary analysis stage, significant impacts on the en-
vironment are not indicated, an agency issues a "finding of no signifi-
cant impact" or a FONSI. 14 Concurrent with the determination of a
FONSI, an agency will usually present documentation as to why an
impact statement is not necessary in the form of the environmental
assessment.' 5 The environmental assessment provides evidence of a
critical procedural step in the process and also provides evidence for
judicial review.
If significant impacts on the environment are indicated, the
agency then issues a "notice of intent" and determines the proper
scope of impacts to be considered and the level of action alternatives
that are to be explored.' 6 This process is important because it deter-
mines not only the "breadth" of environmental impacts, but also the
presumed extent and reach of the project and its connections with
other actions. An environmental impact statement must provide suffi-
cient information for a decision maker to consider the environmental
impacts of a project; it must also examine alternatives to the action. 17
At this stage, public hearings or opportunities to comment in writing
are usually held to include public input into the "scoping document."' 8
After the scope of the impact statement is determined, the agency
prepares the "draft environmental impact statement" or DEIS, which
10. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 869.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) and (E) (1988).
12. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (1993).
13. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1508.9 (1993).
14. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1993).
15. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e) (1993).
16. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1508.22 (1993).
17. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14-.16 (1993).
18. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1993).
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is published in the Federal Register.19 Public and other relevant
agency comment on the DEIS is then considered and incorporated
into the "final environmental impact statement" or FEIS, which is also
published in the Federal Register. 20 The agency must consider the
FEIS before it takes action on a project. Occasionally, because of the
discovery of new information or because of a realization that the FEIS
is inadequate, an agency, of its own accord or under court order, may
prepare a "supplementary environmental impact statement" or
SEIS.21 All environmental impact statements, together with com-
ments and responses, are filed with the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality.22 An agency can-
not take any action requiring the preparation of an EIS until at least
90 days after the publication of the DEIS in the Federal Register and
30 days after the publication of the FEIS in the Federal Register.2 3
Although the point was hotly debated shortly after NEPA was
passed, case law indicates that NEPA is primarily procedural-that is,
once the environmental impacts are "considered," the actual decision
or action by the federal agency is discretionary.24 The consideration
of environmental impacts is the method by which environmental pro-
tection was to be a made part of the mandate of every federal
agency.2 5 Congress hoped to influence decision making of federal
agencies by forcing them to analyze and publicize information about
the environmental effects of actions.26
Analysis of NEPA's requirements reveals several questions for a
federal agency: is there an action? is it federal? is it significant? and
what is the environment? The first three questions examine whether
the environmental impact statement requirement is triggered. This
Article is concerned with the last question-or, in other words, what is
to be considered an "environmental impact" under NEPA.27
19. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9(a), 1503.1, 1506.6 (1993).
20. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9(b), 1503.1, 1506.6.
21. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (1993).
22. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.9 (1993).
23. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1506.1, 1506.10 (1993).
24. See ANDERSON ET Ai-, supra note 5, at 845; Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989).
25. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
26. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1993).
27. NEPA actually requires environmental impact review at two points. The first re-
view determines whether the project has a significant impact on the environment, thus
triggering the EIS requirement. The second environmental review determines what envi-
ronmental impacts are to be considered when an EIS is required. Subject to the constraint
November 1994]
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40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 states that the human environment shall be
interpreted comprehensively to include the natural and physical envi-
ronment and the relationship of people with that environment.28 En-
vironmental impacts include impacts that are "ecological... aesthetic,
historic, cultural, economic, [and] social.., whether direct, indirect, or
cumulative. '2 9 Case law presents similarly broad definitions.30 Courts
have interpreted the term "environment" as encompassing "all of the
factors that affect the quality of human life, [such as] crowding,
squalor, and crime."'31
Under this broad definition of environmental impact, courts have
in fact recognized the aesthetic impact of federal project decisions;32
the impact of decisions on existing land use patterns and neighbor-
hood stability (including neighborhood cohesiveness and crime con-
trol);33 and the impact of decisions on the general concerns of public
health, safety, and community development. 34 In general, all relevant
socioeconomic considerations may be evaluated.35
An early NEPA case summarized the breadth of the environmen-
tal impacts considered under NEPA:
The environmental concerns courts have expressed in these cases
may be classified into four somewhat overlapping categories. The
first regards what might be termed health and public safety. Courts
have examined a project's potential effect on the quality of air and
water, the noise level of the community, and the capacity of existing
or proposed sewage and solid waste facilities. Relevant as well is
whether the project will affect the local crime rate, present fire dan-
gers, or otherwise unduly tap police and fire forces in the commu-
nity. The second category involves consideration of the project's
impact on social services, such as the availability of schools, hospi-
tals, businesses, commuter facilities, and parking. Apart from its
of first determining that there is a physical impact on the environment, a discussion of
environmental impacts will refer to both phases of NEPA analysis.
28. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1993).
29. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (1993).
30. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174 (6th Cir.
1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (1974) (discussing the congressional mandate that federal deci-
sion making under NEPA reflect broad environmental concerns).
31. Jones v. United States Dept. Hous. Urban Dev., 390 F. Supp. 579, 591 (E.D. La.
1974).
32. See, e.g., Mahelona v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 418 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (D. Haw. 1976)
(finding that a significant aesthetic consequence may impact the human environment).
33. McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221, 246 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
34. Como-Falcon Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dept. Labor, 465 F. Supp. 850, 859-
60 (D. Minn. 1978), aff'd and modified, 609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
936 (1980).
35. Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Exon, 466 F. Supp. 639, 655-56 (D. Neb. 1979),
affd, 604 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1979).
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impact on a community's services, a project may alter the character
of the area in which it locates-the third category. Conformance to
local zoning ordinances, harmonization with proximate land uses,
and a blending with the aesthetics of the area are concerns relevant
to this category. The final category involves consideration of the
project's impact on the community's development policy. Reloca-
tion of a federal facility from a downtown to a suburban location,
for example, might contribute to urban blight and decay. Neighbor-
hood stability and growth are values which have been found to be
cognizable under NEPA.3 6
Although the sociological effects of projects have been recog-
nized as environmental impacts under NEPA, many courts have held
that an analysis of sociological and other secondary environmental
factors is only required if there also has been a direct impact on the
physical environment.37
This limitation was at issue in the most important United States
Supreme Court case outlining the type of environmental impacts that
may be considered under NEPA. In Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Peo-
ple Against Nuclear Energy38 [hereinafter PANE], the Supreme Court
stated that damage to psychological health caused by the risk of a nu-
clear accident was beyond the purview of NEPA.39 The Court deter-
mined that Congress intended the word "environment" as used in the
context of "environmental impact" to mean the "physical environ-
ment. '40 The Court explained the words "physical environment," by
reference to the conference report on the bill wherein Senator Jackson
stated that the bill would avoid harm to the air, land, and water.41
However, the Court recognized that controlling the physical effects of
a governmental action is the procedural means to achieve the ultimate
goal of enhancing overall human health and welfare.42 Following this
logic, in PANE, the Supreme Court determined that government
agencies could consider non-physical environmental impacts under
NEPA as long as NEPA was "read to include a requirement of a rea-
sonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical en-
36. Como-Falcon, 465 F. Supp. at 859.
37. See Mary Elizabeth Nelson, Note, Rejection of Risk Under NEPA, Stress, and
"People Against Nuclear Energy", 33 AM. U. L. Rav. 535, 552 (1984) (discussing the doc-
trine of primary and secondary effects).
38. 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
39. Id. at 775. However, the Court did note that certain psychological stress might be
cognizable under NEPA if it was caused by a direct sensory impact. See also Animal Lov-
ers Volunteers Ass'n (ALVA) v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1985).
40. PANE, 460 U.S. at 772.
41. Id. at 773 (citation omitted).
42. Id.
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vironment and the effect at issue." 43 The Court explained that this
"requirement is like the familiar doctrine of proximate cause in tort
law."'44 The Court noted that the impacts of realized risks, which are
physical, are to be considered, but that the impacts of the risks them-
selves, which are non-physical, are not.45 Under the Court's analysis
in PANE, if an "impact," like psychological stress, results from a non-
physical change to the environment, such as an unrealized risk, the
connection between the psychological stress and the government ac-
tion is not close enough to trigger the NEPA regulatory framework.46
In reaching its decision in PANE, the Court also noted that exam-
ining purely psychological effects that have no direct causal link to a
physical change in the environment would make NEPA analysis un-
manageable.47 "The scope of the agency's inquiries must remain man-
ageable if NEPA's goal of 'insur[ing] a fully informed and well
considered decision,' . . . is to be accomplished." 48 The Court ex-
pressed the view that examining purely psychological health effects
under federal projects would require agencies "to expend considera-
ble resources developing psychiatric expertise that is not otherwise
relevant to their congressionally assigned functions," which would
lessen resources available for protection of the physical environ-
ment.49 Thus, the court validated the proposition that there is no bar
to consideration of any "environmental" impacts under NEPA, includ-
ing psychological ones, as long as they were the result of a physical
change in the environment. As the Court stated:
Examination of NEPA's provisions reveals that Congress, in speak-
ing of the "human environment," was not concerned solely with the
physical environment .... The congressional declaration of pur-
pose speaks of encouraging harmony between people and their en-
vironment .... The declaration of national environmental policy,
the keystone of NEPA, recognizes both the effects of people on the
natural environment and the effects of changes in the environment
on the welfare and development of people.50
In the body of NEPA case law there appears to be only one sig-
nificant substantive limitation to the breadth of environmental im-
43. Id. at 774.
44. Id. at 775.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 776.
48. Id. at 776 (citations omitted) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Reference Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
49. PANE, 460 U.S. at 776.
50. George J. Skelly, Note, Psychological Effects at NEPA's Threshold, 83 COLUM. L.
REv. 336, 341-42 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT OF THE MIND
pacts that may be considered under NEPA, and that is a limitation on
considering "environmental impacts" that are the result of bias or dis-
crimination.5 1 The courts that have come to this conclusion appear to
be concerned that people are using NEPA to avoid economic, racial,
and cultural integration of neighborhoods, thereby enshrining exclu-
sionary zoning. In Como-Falcon, in which the plaintiffs were arguing
that in citing a proposed federal job corps center, the Department of
Labor should have prepared an environmental impact statement be-
cause of the effects of the project on crime and the character of the
neighborhood, the court tried to distinguish impacts on neighborhood
character from impacts resulting from the presence of people that
others might consider undesirable.5 2 The court stated "that the mere
influx of low-income persons into a wealthier community should not
be regarded as an adverse environmental impact. '53
In summary, NEPA provides federal agencies a broad mandate
regarding what is to be considered as a part of the environment for
purposes of environmental impact analyses. The only limitations ap-
pear to be (1) that an "environmental impact" must have some causal
connection to a change in the physical environment and (2) that it can
not be based on the presence of societal discrimination or bias.
However, even though NEPA requires that governmental actors
consider all relevant significant environmental impacts of an action
(outside of discriminatory ones), case law has not yet recognized im-
pacts on certain important environmental values that should be part
of the NEPA decision-making process: values concerning risk alloca-
tion and our society's philosophical values about the environment.5 4
Today, the values of environmental philosophy and environmental
risk allocation have not yet been recognized as environmental values
that may be affected by governmental decisions. The next two Sec-
tions of this Article will show that they are important environmental
51. See Como-Falcon Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dept. Labor, 465 F. Supp. 850,
859-60 (D. Minn. 1978), affd and modified, 609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 936 (1980); Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n. v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Maryland-National Capitol Park & Planning
Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
52. Como-Falcon, 465 F. Supp. at 857-58.
53. Id. at 857 (citation omitted); see also Trinity Episcopal Sch. Dist. v. Romney, 387
F. Supp. 1044, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 523 F.2d
88 (2nd Cir. 1975) (holding that alleged anti-social behavior of low income persons is not to
be considered under NEPA).
54. I use the term "value" broadly to mean anything that is desired or brings a posi-
tive benefit to a society or person whether or not the benefit is measurable in monetary
terms.
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values, and thus, impacts on them from governmental decisions must
be considered when analyzing environmental impacts under NEPA.
il. Environmental Risk Is an Environmental Value
Although much of the discussion in the United States concerning
environmental laws and risks presents the value of environmental reg-
ulation or mitigation only in terms of human lives saved or the effect
on human health, 55 broader values often factor in our environmental
decision-making process. Yet, even though these values play a part in
our environmental regulatory policy, they are not uniformly consid-
ered in NEPA analyses as environmental values that can be affected
by agency action. One of these often overlooked values is the value
we assign to the presence and distribution of environmental risks.
It has long been clear that human beings value certain kinds of
risks differently, i.e. some people may want to avoid involuntary expo-
sure, or particularly painful deaths, while for others it is more impor-
tant to avoid an uncertain death.56 "Tolerable' risk level issues are
inextricably linked with the process by which the risk was allocated or
imposed.' 57 The ability to control one's own fate or perceive that
one's fate is in one's own control is important to people. Many people
do not like to be subjected to risks that are not of their own choosing
or from which they receive no commensurate benefit. It has been esti-
mated that voluntary risks are preferable to involuntary risks by a fac-
tor of over 1000.5 8 Therefore, how we allocate risks is a value that
shapes our regulation and use of the environment.59 For ease of dis-
cussion, I call this value environmental risk allocation.
Mark Sagoff's description of the concerns that residents of Lewis-
ton, New York had in the face of nearby radioactive wastes highlights
this point, as he noted that there are differences "between the risks
[the residents] take, for example, by smoking or by driving, and the
risks imposed on them, for example, by a nearby but hidden deposi-
tory for nuclear wastes. There is an ethical difference between jump-
55. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE, TOWARD EF-
FECTIVE RIsK REGULATION 15-16 (1993).
56. Id. at 15-16.
57. Roger E. Kasperson, Six Propositions on Public Participation and Their Relevance
for Risk Communication, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 275, 280 (1986).
58. Starr, Social Benefit vs. Technological Risk, 165 SCIENCE 1232, 1235 (1969).
59. W.D. ROWE, AN ANATOMY OF RISK 136-37 (1977); see generally Daniel Golernan,
Hidden Rules Often Distort Ideas of Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1994, at Cl (describing psy-
chological factors affecting risk perception and allocation).
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ing and being pushed-even if the [objective] risks and benefits are
the same." 6
Assuming that the study of legislation can be a window into
human preferences, and thus human values, 61 evidence that values as-
sociated with environmental risk allocation have had great importance
in our own society can be seen by their presence in CERCLA regula-
tion.62 CERCLA requires a cleanup of environmentally contaminated
sites to "assur[e] protection of human health," without regard to
costs.6 3 Such a statutory scheme internalizes private risk externalities
by forcing the producer of the risk to contain it. Because CERCLA
forgoes traditional cost benefit analysis (such as whether the allevia-
tion of health concerns is justified by the costs of the program) to
cleanup contaminated sites in favor of imposing the costs of total
cleanup exclusively on the "polluting" party (which may be much
more expensive), there must be a large "value" or "cost" associated
with risk allocation.64 In other words, if society is willing to spend
money that has no perceivable effect beyond an alteration of the allo-
cation of a risk, the allocation of that risk must be a value. Thus, costs
that the government imposes upon an individual person or company
to reduce the risk to others from activities of that individual person or
company may not represent societal judgment about the value or
harm of that risk itself, but rather a recognition of the value of the
allocation of the risk. The value given to risk allocation is derived
from the preference that whatever risks individual activities cause,
those risks should be borne by the company or person benefitting
60. MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 46 (1988).
61. ERIC ASHBY, RECONCILING MAN WITH THE ENVIRONMENT 8 (1978) (describing
legislation as validation of public opinion). This assumption is not universally agreed with,
and there are significant limitations-such as the relative power between political interest
groups-to its application. Such objections could be the subject of their own article. For
purposes of this Article, I assume that in a democracy, legislation generally reflects the
wants and desires of a majority of our society.
62. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1) (1988).
64. This, of course, assumes that the law acts in an economically efficient manner such
that laws most economically preserve the societal values they represent. There is some
amount of disagreement over this assumption. Although law and economics theory as-
sumes that common law may be driven by economic efficiency, this may not be true of
statutory law. Nevertheless, since society presumably wishes to effectuate its desires as
economically as possible, the tendency should be for statutory laws to accomplish their
goals in an economically efficient manner.
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from the activity. Therefore, at least under CERCLA, the allocation
of risk has value apart from the harm from the risk itself. 65
Strict liability in tort law provides a more general example of the
recognition of the value of risk allocation. Generally, strict liability
forces individuals or companies to pay for any harm resulting from
their services or products without regard to fault or negligence, even if
the person harmed might have been able to avoid the harm at a lower
cost than the tortfeasor. 66
In the context of environmental harms, however, traditional tort
law does not adequately accommodate the value attached to risk allo-
cation. For example, because the causation mechanisms for cancer
are sometimes unknown and difficult to trace, it would be very hard
for an individual living near a toxic waste dump who developed cancer
to prove that the cancer was caused entirely or in part by the individ-
ual's proximity to the waste dump.67 But causation is a necessary and
required element for tort recovery. 68 Therefore, because tort law can-
not effectively compensate victims for exposure to carcinogens by
forcing companies and individuals to internalize their costs through
tort liability, society accommodates the value of risk allocation under
CERCLA by choosing to require that the individuals and companies
who produce toxic wastes directly internalize the costs of destroying
them, containing them, or otherwise rendering them harmless without
regard to cost.69
Paradoxically, our wish to have the government require other
persons to control the outcomes of their behavior reflects our own
desire that our day-to-day activities not be altered or coerced in order
to reduce risk. This freedom from coercion in the context of risk con-
trol has a value and explains why many of our environmental manage-
ment policies do not rely on large "education" or compulsory
65. Economists might see the problem differently as the disjunction between people's
willingness to accept (WTA) a risk and their willingness to pay (WTP) for risk alleviation.
In theory, the willingness to accept a risk is much higher than the willingness to pay, and
this could explain the large costs associated with allocating risk on people who perceive
that they hold an entitlement to be risk free. See Jack Knetsch, Asking the Right Question:
The Reference Point and Measures of Welfare Change 14-16 (1994) (on file with the
author).
66. WILLIAM PROSSER, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 705, 728 (5th ed. 1982).
67. Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation,
52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732,739 (1984-85); Note, The Impracticality of Traditional Tort Anal-
ysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation,
35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 614 (1983).
68. WILLIAM PROSSER, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 236 (4th ed. 1971).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1) (1988).
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behavior programs to accomplish policy objectives. This is true even
though such programs may be more "cost effective" than current pro-
grams from the government's point of view.70
Thus, it may be true that it would be cheaper to require everyone
to put on sunscreen than to ban chlorofluorocarbons, which may be
responsible for the destruction of the ozone layer. However, such a
policy choice would require us as individuals to expend time and en-
ergy it has a great personal cost. The fact that such a program is not
implemented demonstrates, once again, that there is a value to risk
allocation.
Similar policy discussions have centered on laws requiring the use
of seat belts and motorcycle helmets or coercive governmental pro-
grams designed to produce changes in Americans' drinking, smoking,
and dietary habits.71 Though some regulations coercing individual be-
havior have been implemented, the policy debates usually focus on
correcting for the external costs of personal action (such as the cost of
health care for uninsured motorcyclists) rather than on using coercion
as a tool to lower the "costs" of risk.
Thus, there are values and costs associated with the allocation of
risk. Where allocation of environmental risks are indicated in connec-
tion with a governmental action, these environmental values require
an environmental impact analysis under NEPA.
IV. Environmental Philosophy Is an Environmental Value
Environmental laws such as CERCLA, RCRA, TSCA, and
FIFRA72 are primarily based on values concerning the protection of
human life. However, many of society's environmental policy choices
can only logically be explained by the desire to preserve a particular
philosophy or world view concerning the environment.73 Thus, this
philosophy must have value, at least to some. What I refer to as envi-
70. BREYER, supra note 55, at 23.
71. Stephen Sugarman, Nader's Failures?: A Review of Jerry Mashaw's and David
Harfst's The Struggle for Auto Safety, 80 CAL_ L. Rpv. 289 (1992); Peter Huber, Safety and
the Second Best" The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 277, 281 (1985).
72. Respectively, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601, and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
73. The benefits of toxic control laws could extend more strongly to the natural envi-
ronment, particularly in the case of insecticides arid other pest relief measures. Although
only recently linked to breast cancer, DDT has long been banned in our country for its
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ronmental philosophical values are the values we place on preserving
the environment in a natural state regardless of apparent direct
human benefits.74 As Thomas Heller describes, environmental philos-
ophy presumes that "nature is a source of value not because it is used
but because it continues to exist. ' 75 Environmental philosophical val-
ues are sometimes harder to see than other values and may not even
be consciously recognized, but they exist nonetheless.76
The writings of Thoreau and Emerson evidence the historical
presence of an environmental philosophy that values unaltered na-
ture. Emerson believed that nature held the secrets of life and that
only through the contemplation of unaltered nature could a person
reach his or her true pinnacle. Unlike the later conservation move-
ment, the benefit of nature was not solely in serving the material or
even aesthetic needs of humankind, but in a deeper philosophical
goal. As stated by Emerson, "all natural objects make a kindred im-
pression [of a 'certain reverence'] when the mind is open to their in-
fluence. It is this which distinguishes the stick of timber of the wood-
cutter from the tree of the poet . . . . 77 It is possible to argue that
ultimately this philosophy is human centered, but this simply brings up
the seeming paradox of whether anything humans value can ever have
benefit to humans apart from the fact that they value it.
effects on the animal and plant world as detailed in RACHEL CARSON, SILErNr SPRING
(1962).
74. I do not idly choose the term "philosophy." Philosopher George Sessions has
written that the change in environmental values since the 1960s is fundamentally religious
and philosophical. George Sessions, The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review, 11 ENV.
REV. 107 (1987).
75. Thomas C. Heller, The Importance of Normative Decisionmaking: The Limitation
of Legal Economics as a Basis for Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated by the Regulation
of Vacation Home Development, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 385. 405. Other commentators are
more specific. Robert Paehlke defines a 13-point list that encompasses the concerns of
environmental philosophy. Robert C. Paehlke, Environmental Values and Public Policy, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s, at 350-51 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds.,
2d ed. 1993).
76. In discussing whether we need to create an environmental ethic, Robin Attfield
recognizes the presence of an environmental ethic or philosophy that need only be ac-
knowledged to have its needed effect:
The case for a new ethic should rather consist in exhibiting principles which have
not always been recognized but which are nevertheless implicit in our moral tradi-
tions, or, perhaps, in morality itself, and which it is important now to
acknowledge.
ROBIN ATTFIELD, THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 4 (2d ed. 1991).
77. Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Romantic Philosophy of Nature, in AMERICA AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 4 (John Opie ed. 1971).
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These philosophical values have continued and have even gained
popularity in modem times.78 As Mark Sagoff notes, the entire dis-
tinction between modem environmentalism and the old conservation
movement is that modem environmentalism supports the preservation
of the environment as a goal in and of itself. In Sagoff's words:
The environmental movement which arose in the 1960s and 1970s
differs from conservationism in defending a nonutilitarian concep-
tion of man's relationship to nature .... "A thing is right when it
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community. It is wrong otherwise." 79
According to Eric Ashby in his book, Reconciling Man with the
Environment, the evidence for the existence of a modem environmen-
tal philosophical value for natural preservation for its own sake
"comes from the study of public opinion and social legislation, which
is often the formal validation of public opinion."' 0 Ashby cites the
opposition to the building of a reservoir at Cow Green in England.
Ashby noted that there was no question as to the quantifiable useful-
ness of the reservoir of Cow Green, "no one lived in Cow Green and
the place was useless for agriculture."8' However, in 1964, a battle
was fought over the reservoir because many felt that a plant, the Tees-
dale Sandwort, which had no known use to humans, might be
harmed.8
In our own country, a concrete example of the use of the value of
environmental philosophy can be found in the Endangered Species
Act8 3 which decrees that no action, such as a direct killing or habitat
destruction, should be taken against an animal or plant species faced
with extinction. Though at various times policy makers have tried to
assign "rational" values to the policy embodied in the Endangered
Species Act (such as the fact that a given plant or animal might hold
the secret to the cure for cancer or that humans enjoy admiring cer-
tain animals),84 these "rational" values cannot explain the breadth of
78. See, e.g., Plastic Trees, supra note 7, at 338-46 (detailing the discussion of the basis
for environmental philosophy between Laurence Tribe and Mark Sagoff).
79. Mark Sagoff, Can Environmentalists be Liberals? Jurisprudential Foundations of
Environmentalism, 16 ENVTL. L. 775, 779-80 (1986) (citation omitted) (quoting A. Leo-
pold, The Land Ethic, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC wrrH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION
FROM RoUND RIVER 262 (1949).
80. ASmBY, supra note 61, at 8.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 9.
83. The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
84. See Plastic Trees, supra note 7, at 344 (stating that preserving endangered species
may further human welfare).
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the prohibition.8 5 If such justifications were the case, the law should
not apply to certain species (like the snail darter) that provide neither
an aesthetically pleasing appearance nor the potential for other con-
crete benefits.8 6
Similarly, evidence of environmental philosophy can be found in
the legislative preambles to our major environmental statutes, such as
the Clean Water Act, which state as their goal not a reduction in pol-
lution to a non-harmful level, but an ethical objective such as a cleaner
environment. 87
This environmental philosophy can also be seen in decisionmak-
ing at the micro level. For example, the concept of a "nature retreat"
to gain moral strength and fortitude is an acceptable individual deci-
sion in our culture. In addition, "wastage" of the environment has
long been frowned upon in most societies; for example, our literature
does not show Robinson Crusoe laying waste to his island as he
planned to leave.88 Finally, some Christians believe that their faith
requires them to protect the environment as a protection of God's
creation.89
Though manifest in different forms, these examples demonstrate
a deeply ingrained notion about what humans should and should not
do with respect to the natural environment. There clearly exists a
view of nature as having intrinsic worth and an inherent value that is
as important a reason to protect the environment as environmental
impacts on human health.90
85. Although not explicitly considered in this Article, there is certainly another phi-
losophy at play in our societal decisions regarding endangered species-the philosophy of
animal rights. Animal rights may be related or unrelated to environmental philosophy
depending on the person holding the belief., i.e., some persons who believe that animals
have intrinsic rights might consider this a right of "nature," while others might focus solely
on the animals.
6. In a highly unusual action, Congress precluded the snail darter from Endangered
Species Act coverage.
87. Sagoff, supra note 60, at 14; see also Plastic Trees, supra note 7, at 337, 357 (noting
that often the environmental goals of major federal environmental statutes are only limited
by "economic and technological feasibility").
88. See DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE (Knopf 1992). My thanks to Mary Midg-
ley for this example.
89. See, e.g., Ari L. Goldman, Religion Notes, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 23, 1994, at 10 (noting
the environmentally protective efforts of the Interfaith National Religious Partnership for
the Environment).
90. ASHBY, supra note 61, at 7-8; cf. ATrmELD, supra note 76, at 146 (questioning the
theory behind the "environmental ethic," but acknowledging that the possibility of objects
having intrinsic value "remains an open one").
[Vol. 46
THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT OF THE MIND
Environmental philosophy can also be seen in the very existence
of the "sustainable development" movement. 91 Critics have identified
some parts of the sustainable development movement as calling for
draconian behavioral changes in the name of very little safety or envi-
ronmental protection.92 If the criticism of the movement, that it re-
fuses to recognize the validity of certain cost benefit analysis, is
correct, then this supports the theory that some value other than
human health is an important factor in crafting environmental policy.
Of course, the origin of environmental philosophy may well be
related to values associated with human health or the economic con-
cept of self-interest. For pre-industrial societies, environmental im-
pacts of their actions were generally localized and environmental
destruction could often be seen and attributed to specific actions.
Since effects were localized and specifically related to behavior, the
immediate economic impact of environmental degradation was at
least partially internalized. 93 As human activity, mobility, population,
and technology increased, the effects of one's individual action may
not have been as apparent, while the effects of cumulative destruction
may have become more noticeable. 94 To preserve the common good a
moral compact, now enshrined in this environmental philosophy, must
have arisen to prohibit unrestrained degradation of the environment
for the benefit of all. If I do not degrade the environment, neither will
you. 95
91. Although parties use different definitions, in general "sustainable development"
refers to "development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Jonathon Lesser & Richard
Zerbe, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Sustainability: Issues and Policies 1-2 (1994) (on file
with author).
92. John Baden, Balancing the Earth's Economy and Ecology, FREE PERSPECrIVES,
Summer 1993, at 1.
93. As one note states:
In the past, it can be argued, humans understood the fragility of nature and their
ability to produce effects harmful to it. Furthermore, the harm humans might
have produced, such as overgrazing livestock or overpopulating the land, had
profound effects not only on nature, but on humans themselves. Overgrazing or
overpopulation, for example, would generally have resulted in starvation or relo-
cation, both trying experiences.
Kenneth W. Swenson, Note, A Stitch in Time: The Continental Shelf, Environmental Eth-
ics, and Federalism, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 851, 874-75 (1987).
94. For instance, if people put hydrocarbons (which have become more commonly
used in the household in the last three decades) in city drainage and sewage systems, the
impact does not fall entirely on them. Yet, the cumulative impacts of such actions affect
the environment and the health of everyone.
95. Evelyn Shirk also believes that this environmental philosophical value arose as a
replacement for other values, but that it arose more recently and replaced Mother Nature's
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Consider, for example, the modern "morality" or "philosophy"
which teaches that stealing is "bad" even in the absence of "punish-
ment" or "economic loss." Why do we have such a philosophy? Such
a rule is certainly not in the individual's narrow economic self-interest
since it prohibits taking useful objects (or money that purchases these
objects) that are needed. However, such a moral compact became
necessary when individuals were no longer able to personally protect
all of their possessions from marauders. To avoid chaos, members of
most early societies were willing to forgo the ability to take goods
freely (except in specific situations such as war and conquest) if it
meant that their own goods would be similarly protected.96 I believe
environmental philosophy arose in such a fashion.
As our society puts even more pressure on the environment, lead-
ing to even more environmental harms without specific individual
causes,97 the importance or value of environmental philosophy may
increase. Our society's very power to drastically alter the earth may
accentuate the philosophy not to do so.
The fact that these environmental philosophical values are some-
times not explicitly acknowledged should not detract from the value
they have to society. Both sides of the regulatory debate often engage
in a conspiratorial silence about these values. Even if they are con-
sciously aware of these values, those who hold philosophical values
about environmental regulation often do not discuss them for fear of
being labelled irrational.98 Meanwhile, those who do not recognize or
value environmental philosophy may not emphasize its presence in
others for fear that people will latch onto it as legitimate. Aldo Leo-
attempts at protection of the environment, not our own protection resulting from eco-
nomic self-interest. As she writes:
Our nurturing "mother" was previously understood to be self-rejuvenating. She
could be counted on to regrow her forests despite the woodsman, purify her
streams despite the dumpster, restore her lakes despite the fishermen, and replen-
ish the land with animals despite the huntsman.
See Evelyn Shirk, New Dimensions in Ethics: Ethics and the Environment, in ETHICS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 4 (Richard Hart ed., 1992).
96. Perhaps the classic "prisoner's dilemma" would not be such a dilemma if there
were a prevalent philosophy that taught that everyone should try to protect each other's
interest, and thereby protect her own.
97. For example, see Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir.
1972), aff d, 492 F.2d 466 (1974).
98. Mark Sagoff opines that the reason many people do not admit to holding an envi-
ronmental philosophy, though it plays such an enormous role in our societal decisions, is
"the insecurity [that] many of us feel when we find ourselves without 'neutral' theories and
criteria against which to evaluate political, ethical, and aesthetic positions." SAGOFF, supra
note 60, at 67.
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pold recognized this "subterfuge" at an earlier time when recognizing
"value" in the mere presence of nature:
One basic weakness in a conservation system based wholly on eco-
nomic motives is that most members of the land community have no
economic value. Wildflowers and songbirds are examples. Of the
22,000 higher plants and animals native to Wisconsin, it is doubtful
whether more than five percent can be sold, fed, eaten, or otherwise
put to economic use. Yet these creatures are members of the biotic
community, and if (as I believe) its stability depends on its integrity,
they are entitled to continuance.
When one of these non-economic categories is threatened, and
if we happen to love it, we invent subterfuges to give it economic
importance. At the beginning of the century songbirds were sup-
posed to be disappearing. Ornithologists jumped to the rescue with
some distinctly shaky evidence to the effect that insects would eat us
up if birds failed to control them. The evidence had to be economic
in order to be valid.99
We should not ignore the value of environmental philosophy sim-
ply because it is unacknowledged or considered illogical. As Daniel
Farber stated:
[R]easons to value something are unnecessary: to value something
is simply to care about it. Just as we accept as valid that which we
see, we can accept as valid that which we care about. In life ...
neither perception nor caring needs any logical foundation. 1' °
Thus, environmental philosophy is an environmental value. As
an environmental value, impacts on it should be considered in the
NEPA process.
V. Once Recognized as Environmental Values, NEPA
Requires an Analysis of Environmental Risk
Allocation and Environmental Philosophical
Values When Environmental Impacts Are Considered
As significant environmental values that can be affected by gov-
ernmental action, this Article argues that these environmental values,
which I have described as environmental risk allocation and environ-
mental philosophy, must be considered when environmental impacts
are analyzed under NEPA.
99. Aldo Leopold, Immoral Man and the Moral Universe, in AMERICANS AND Tim
ENVRONmENT 43, 52 (John Opie ed., 1971). Robin Attfield also recognizes the need to
acknowledge values. ATrmELD, supra note 76, at 4.
100. Plastic Trees, supra note 7, at 345.
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A. Statutory and Case Law Interpretation Require the Consideration of
These Values
Examining NEPA language indicates that such consideration is
compelled when one recognizes environmental risk allocation and en-
vironmental philosophy as environmental values. Under NEPA, an
impact statement is required for all major federal action "significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." 101 The implement-
ing regulations define the scope of the human environment broadly,
"[h]uman environment shall be interpreted comprehensively to in-
clude the natural and physical environment and the relationship of
people with that environment." 0 2 As concepts that have value to
people, environmental risk allocation and environmental philosophy
are part of the relationship of people with the environment, and they
can be significantly affected by specific federal actions.
Congressional intent further supports the consideration of envi-
ronmental risk allocation and environmental philosophy as values to
be considered under NEPA. As noted in Part III, risk allocation is a
type of externality, and Congress clearly intended to correct for envi-
ronmental externalities in the passage of NEPA.10 3 Moreover, as for
environmental philosophy, the introduction to NEPA states that "it is
the continuing policy of the Federal Government" to "use all practica-
ble means and measures ... to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony."'1 4 This
statement indicates congressional concern with nature as a mythic
whole, not a concern for nature solely for the benefit of humankind.
Many cases recognize the expansive congressional intent in enact-
ing NEPA. s05 As noted in Part II, the only limitation apparent from
the case law and regulatory interpretation of the statute that could
affect the consideration of these values is that so-called secondary im-
pacts on the human environment-such as socioeconomic impacts or
impacts on neighborhood stability-are only to be considered if they
are causally related to changes in the physical environment. 1°6 In
101. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
102. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1993).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1988).
105. PANE, 460 U.S. at 775.
106. Environmental Defense Fund, 468 F.2d at 1112-15; Como-Falcon, 465 F. Supp. at
857-58 n.3 (noting case law holding that social and economic effects alone do not trigger an
EIS in the absence of a "primary impact on the physical environment").
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other words, there must be some physical effect to trigger a NEPA
analysis.107
The value of environmental risk allocation meets this require-
ment. In PANE, 08 although the Court spoke of "risk" itself as not
being related in a general sense to the physical environment, the
Court explicitly noted that realized risks are a part of the physical
environment and that impacts which could flow from a risk if it were
realized should be considered in the NEPA process.10 9 Thus, in
PANE it was appropriate for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) to consider the possible effects on the environment that might
result if the risk of a nuclear accident were realized. However, the
NRC was not required to consider any psychological harm that re-
sulted from the presence of the unrealized risk itself because the
"risk" was not a physical effect, and therefore the psychological harm
was not causally connected to a change in the physical environment."10
Unlike psychological stress in the PANE case, which the Court
held was not cognizable under NEPA, the harms associated with envi-
ronmental risk allocation are only present after the risk has been real-
ized. For instance, there is no cost to disproportionately bearing the
increased risk of cancer from leaking chemical agents caused by the
externality associated with another's behavior unless risk of increased
cancer rates has first been realized. Thus, an impact on the physical
environment from a realized risk is present before the environmental
risk allocation value is affected. Wherever there is an environmental
risk involved in government action, NEPA requires an analysis of the
impacts of that risk if realized, and this should include the impact on
environmental risk allocation. For example, if a federal agency
planned to store plutonium (a potent carcinogenic, radioactive, and
107. Standing requirements also limit the ability of plaintiffs to challenge the applica-
tion of NEPA in federal court. Under NEPA, a plaintiff must allege that the action caused
the plaintiff to be "adversely affected or aggrieved... within the meaning of a relevant
statute."' Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1988)).
Although in Lujan the injury alleged by the plaintiffs was not considered to be suffi-
ciently specific to the federal action at issue, the Court recognized that such values as
"recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment" are within the zone of interest protected by
NEPA. Id at 3187. Presumably, protection of any environmental value would be included
in the NEPA zone of interest. If environmental risk allocation and environmental philoso-
phy are recognized as environmental values, their consideration under NEPA could be
raised in federal court if the harm were specifically tied to the action.
108. PANE, 460 U.S. at 775.
109. Id. at 775 & n.9; see also Olmsted Citizens For a Better Community v. United
States, 793 F.2d 201, 205 (8th Cir. 1986).
110. PANE, 460 U.S. at 774-77.
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toxic compound)"' and there were any risk of leakage, a court would
have to consider the direct environmental impact of the leakage, in-
cluding health risks, if such leakage occurred. Similarly, the court
would have to consider the impact of allocation of such health risks on
the citizenry.
It is possible that environmental risk allocation might not be an
environmental value for purposes of NEPA if the risk were only tenu-
ously related to a government action. PANE indicated, and other
cases recognize, that the causal link between action and harm may
sometimes be too attenuated to require a NEPA analysis. 112 This is
particularly true when the "action" is really an absence of governmen-
tal action. 113 However, in such cases, true risk from the governmental
decision is apt to be relatively low, and the resultant risk allocation
value would thus be low as well. Therefore, the requirement of an
initial physical impact under NEPA does not prevent the considera-
tion of risk allocation values. 114
Similarly, an impact on environmental philosophical values is al-
most always the result of, and therefore causally related to, an actual
change in the physical environment. In general, there can be no con-
cern over the alteration of the Earth or an irrevocable commitment
and endangerment of the Earth's environment, and thus no impact on
111. CRC HANDBOOK OF CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS, at B17 (Robert C. Weast ed., 60th
ed. 1979).
112. See GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge, 841 F.2d 946, 951-52 (9th
Cir. 1988), as amended on denial of reh'g, 855 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
causal link between construction of an Air Force communication system and the risk of
nuclear war is too tenuous to require the consideration of an EIS); see also Glass Packag-
ing Inst. v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting as "specious" a NEPA
claim that the introduction of a new plastic bottle into the marketplace leads to the risk of
tampering), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984).
113. See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Buckley, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment) (holding that the alleged fail-
ure of the USDA to prevent "degradation of genetic diversity that threatens the food sup-
ply" could not be said to be the proximate cause of that degradation).
114. There has been at least one federal circuit court that has implicitly failed to recog-
nize the existence of a risk allocation value separately from the risk itself. See City of
Aurora v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1984). In a footnote, the Tenth Circuit stated that
the environmental impact of a realized risk does not have to be considered if "total risk"
has not been increased by the project. Id. at 1468 n.8. In theory, this would mean that if a
project shifted risk to different persons but the total risk was not changed, the "risk alloca-
tion value" of this shift need not be considered. Despite the fact that one could employ
this reasoning to argue that it is never necessary to consider environmental risk allocation
values, this comment is dicta and came from a case in which the risk at issue shifted not
from the government or party receiving a benefit to an "innocent" third party, but from
some "innocent" third parties to other "innocent" third parties. Therefore, this case did
not consider the issue of risk allocation as discussed in this Article.
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the value of those preferences in our society, unless some actual physi-
cal change in the environment, however small, is contemplated-
whether it is cutting a tree, depleting an aquifer, mining, building a
dam, or creating and introducing a new genetic strain of potato.
Of course, it is always possible that environmental philosophical
concerns could arise too early in the process to trigger NEPA analysis.
For instance, the decision to undertake some kinds of research could
give rise to concerns about the ultimate results of that research even
when no physical impact to the environment had occurred. Neverthe-
less, there would always be an intervening step of physical action im-
plementing the research before harms could result, and the
philosophical impacts should be considered at that time." 5
Therefore, the requirement of an initial physical impact under
NEPA does not prevent the consideration of environmental philo-
sophical values.
B. The Practical Difficulties of Quantification Do Not Limit
Consideration of These Values
Even if NEPA otherwise seems to indicate that the values of envi-
ronmental risk allocation and environmental philosophy should be
considered, the difficulty in quantification could be an objection to a
consideration of these values under NEPA. It appears that the issue
of quantification of values played a role in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in PANE, as the Court stated that Congress intended the NEPA
process to be "manageable.""16
To the extent that this did play a part in the Court's decision, the
analysis might be a misreading of congressional intent. As one com-
mentator stated:
The suggestion that Congress meant to require an EIS only for
readily quantifiable effects is untenable. Congress felt that gaps in
existing scientific knowledge about both current and long-term en-
vironmental effects could cause significant harm to be overlooked in
environmental decisionmaking." 7
Such criticism is supported by the language of NEPA, which calls
for the identification and development of methods "which will insure
that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may
115. See, e.g., Foundation on Econ. Trends, 817 F.2d at 885-86 (holding that the USDA
need not undertake a NEPA analysis of its overall research goals, although particular re-
search projects might trigger NEPA).
116. PANE, 460 U.S. at 776.
117. Skelly, supra note 50, at 352.
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be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking. ' 11 8 Clearly,
there is a burden on the government to work toward a quantification
of uncertain values.
Merely stating that NEPA requires the government to consider
values that are difficult to quantify does not alleviate the practical
problem of actually completing the task. However, the quantification
of environmental risk allocation and environmental philosophical val-
ues is not as difficult as some believe and would not prove a practical
bar to consideration under NEPA.
With respect to environmental risk allocation values, it is usually
easy to recognize actions that cause risk to be borne by others exter-
nal to the action. Although sometimes the magnitude of such risk
might be disputed, if there is a risk of increased health impacts to per-
sons in areas proximate to projects, this risk is usually acknowledged
by the agency conducting the environmental analysis. It is also easy to
identify environmental impacts where mitigation would require or
suggest an alteration in behavior to reduce or avoid the risk.
Once the presence of a risk is recognized, no matter how small,
then simply recognizing that there can be an impact on the value (or
detriment) associated with allocation of risk or the alleviation of risk
through alteration of human behavior is half of the battle of quantifi-
cation. If one recognizes that a risk is foisted on "innocent" neighbors
of a government approved project, then the impact of that project on
the environmental risk allocation value can roughly be determined by
calculating how much it would cost to reallocate the risk on those who
directly receive the benefit.
For example, if a governmental action-such as storage of radio-
active waste-would increase the likelihood of cancer in an area, the
measure of the impact should not simply be the cost of the increased
deaths or injuries that may occur, but the cost of actually blocking the
additional radiation so that it is at a completely safe level. The former
method values only the cost of human lives against the benefits of the
storage capacity, while the latter also values the risk allocation cost of
those lost lives being borne by a particular group of individuals.
CERCLA and RCRA value risk allocation by requiring that ex-
ternal effects of hazardous wastes be minimized. 119 CERCLA does
not allow a merely cost-effective cleanup-comparing costs of cleanup
to the cost of lives lost or affected-but instead requires remediation
to fully protect human health and the environment. Similarly, RCRA
118. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1) (1988).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT OF THE MIND
does not allow a producer of hazardous waste to pay for the negative
effects of the hazardous waste. Rather, it requires that waste contain-
ment be totally protective of human health and the environment with
a goal of totally eliminating "hazardous waste" from the
environment. 120
Similarly, with projects creating risk that would normally be alle-
viated by behavior modification, the mitigation alternative, which
does not require an alteration of behavior, could be compared to the
mitigation measure, which would require behavior alteration, with the
difference in cost serving as a measure of the environmental impact on
the risk allocation value.
For instance, granting a forest service permit to lease a mountain
for private downhill skiing may increase automobile traffic pollution
because of new development. However, one might conclude under a
NEPA analysis that the costs of environmental impacts from air pollu-
tion would be low if the anticipated pollution could be mitigated by
restricting automobile usage either directly or through zoning. But
this would not take into account the cost to individuals of altering
their behavior through housing location or driving restrictions. A
more correct assessment of the environmental impact would examine
the cost of the mitigation alternative, which would not require individ-
ual behavior modification such as the purchase of existing air pollu-
tion sources.121
Environmental risk allocation values could also be measured by
doing a contingent valuation survey to determine how much money
individuals would accept to be exposed to particular risks or to agree
to alter their behavior.'2
Quantifying the impact on philosophical environmental values is
more difficult. After all, if philosophical values are held strongly
enough, it might be hard to put any price on abandoning them. As an
example, how many of us would take money to kill our own par-
ents?123 Certainly for some, environmental philosophical values can
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1988).
121. The skiing example is culled from Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332 (1989).
122. Although there are several significant limitations to the usefulness of such
surveys, such as whether they measure actual economic value or include all interests peo-
ple have in a resource, willingness to accept is probably more accurate than the sometimes
used willingness to pay, since people could be facing the loss of something which they
believe is an entitlement. See Knetsch, supra note 65, at 4-6.
123. Mark Sagoff argues that the discussion of environmental philosophy can not ever
appropriately be placed in economic terms, for the same reason that we cannot put a price
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be this strong, and impacts on them would thus be very costly. Never-
theless, there are possible methods to value environmental philosophy
in most NEPA cases. For example, one could examine the cost of an
alternative action that does not affect environmental philosophical
values as suggested for the environmental risk allocation calculation.
The difference in cost between the alternative that impacts the value
of environmental philosophy and the alternative that does not affect
environmental philosophical values would give us a measure of the
impact of a particular governmental action on the value of environ-
mental philosophy. 124
Other environmental laws might also be used as guides to value
and measurement. Generally, under the Endangered Species Act, if
an action would have a detrimental effect on an endangered species,
the action should not be taken.125 This law indicates a very high value
for the environmental philosophy of species preservation and perhaps
biological diversity as well. Thus, if a proposed governmental action
will permanently destroy a unique environmental setting or a particu-
lar strata of the environment, indicating an impact on the philosophy
of biotic preservation, then even if no endangered species are known
to be affected, the environmental impact of that action should be con-
sidered extremely large. As with risk allocation, contingent valuation
methodology might be used as well.
What this value does not represent is the lost commercial re-
source value of affected resources. As discussed in Part IV, the value
of the philosophy is the preservation of the environment itself, not just
the preservation of the parts of the environment directly useful for
human consumption. The environmental philosophical value of pro-
tecting a resource may therefore be greater and is certainly different
than the sum of its parts.
C. NEPA Requires Consideration of Environmental Risk Allocation and
Environmental Philosophy
In summary, both environmental risk allocation and environmen-
tal philosophical values are environmental values that may be affected
by governmental action. In practical terms, these effects are reason-
on love or life. We simply recognize that there are things we ought not to pay for.
SAGOFF, supra note 60, at 68-69.
124. In this case, even if the philosophical values are not "economic" as suggested by
Mark Sagoff, we have managed to measure the cost of impact avoidance without directly
measuring the value of the philosophy.
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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ably measurable and usually causally related to a direct physical im-
pact. Therefore, according to the language and case law
interpretation of NEPA, which require a consideration of all signifi-
cant environmental impacts related to a physical environmental im-
pact, impacts on environmental risk allocation and environmental
philosophical values should be considered as environmental impacts
under NEPA.
VI. Policy Reasons Support Consideration of Environmental
Risk Allocation and Environmental Philosophy
Under NEPA
In addition to the fact that statutory and case law interpretation
both require consideration of impacts to these values under NEPA,
there are compelling public policy reasons for their consideration as
well.
A. Consideration of These Values Will Improve the Economic Efficiency
of the NEPA Process
As noted in the Introduction to this Article, implementation of
NEPA is often characterized by delay and cost. 126 The integration of
environmental philosophy and environmental risk allocation values
into the NEPA process would increase the efficiency of NEPA and
reduce the "transaction" costs of expense and delay currently associ-
ated with the statute.
Ideally, requiring consideration of all environmental costs of a
government project under NEPA should lead government agencies
and private applicants to immediately discard those proposals for
projects with a disproportionately high environmental cost because
the government should recognize that such projects would not be ap-
proved after the NEPA process. By contrast, if an agency adequately
considers the environmental harms associated with a project, there
should be little environmental opposition to a project, and thus few
lost resources in its implementation.
Ideally, if an agency actually considered all of the environmental
effects in an objective cost benefit manner, the resulting decision
could be supported by any rational thinker, limiting delay. Because
recognition of impacts and their cost to society should be visible rela-
tively early in the process, NEPA should be relatively cost-effective
126. Wald, supra note 4, at 539.
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because proponents and opponents of a project will not be drawn
through a long process just to have the project ultimately canceled.
Yet in many cases, this ideal model does not occur. Agencies rou-
tinely proceed with projects that many people feel should not con-
tinue because of overriding environmental concerns. This apparent
inconsistency between the actual and the ideal might be explained by
arguing that there are certain distributions of the costs and benefits in
any project that prompt the use of NEPA for delay by a certain seg-
ment of society, even if the project were otherwise cost-beneficial af-
ter weighing all of the environmental considerations. One might also
argue that many members of the public are not rational thinkers, and
therefore even if all of the environmental factors were considered, the
public would still use NEPA as a protest mechanism because either
the public does not understand it or irrationally disagrees with the
environmental analysis.
But neither of these theories adequately explains the vast gap
that lies between those who oppose a project on environmental
grounds under NEPA and those who supposedly are considering all of
the environmental impacts of a project. Although in any project deci-
sion there might be winners and losers based on how costs and bene-
fits are distributed-giving some credence to the rational actor model
in manipulating NEPA for her own benefit-distributive effects are
often already considered under NEPA, so this factor alone cannot ex-
plain the gap. Nor do I believe that this gap can be explained by some
vague assertion of irrationality on the part of large segments of our
society.
The real cause of the gap in environmental understanding be-
tween those who conduct a cost benefit analysis using environmental
impacts from the NEPA process and those who oppose the project on
environmental grounds is that NEPA has not been routinely construed
broadly enough to allow for a consideration of all of the environmen-
tal impacts that concern society. Specifically, NEPA has not been con-
strued as requiring consideration of environmental risk allocation and
values associated with risk aversion, nor has it been construed as re-
quiring an analysis of the value derived from holding and supporting a
certain environmental philosophy.
When certain impacts on environmental values, such as environ-
mental risk allocation and environmental philosophy, are not rou-
tinely considered under NEPA, but are of concern to society as a
whole, this initial cost-efficient determination of project feasibility is
lost with respect to these impacts. Allowing consideration of environ-
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mental risk allocation and environmental philosophical values would
make NEPA more efficient. As one commentator stated with respect
to the PANE Court's refusal to consider psychological distress, "[t]his
consideration would.., allow the public to inform the agency of the
public's willingness to accept a particular risk."'12 7
Without consideration of these values, there will be projects,
which may have effects on environmental philosophy or risk alloca-
tion values, that will proceed against a wall of public opposition and
that may ultimately derail them. However, because these values are
not presently considered or even acknowledged under NEPA, the op-
position based on these values will not be well articulated, leaving a
proponent of a project unsure of how to proceed to successfully ad-
dress environmental concerns and complete the project. The opposi-
tion may take the form of a different environmental concern that a
project proponent will address with massive expenditures for mitiga-
tion only to find that this was not the real concern at all, thus, leading
to economic waste. Moreover, the proponents of the project may
never spend resources to address or mitigate the real environmental
concern; consequently, the opposition will remain stalwart.
If the opposition is finally successful in stopping a project, eco-
nomic waste has occurred in gauging the depths of opposition that
should have stopped a project before it even started. NEPA has been
criticized for allowing too much delay to consider environmental
problems, 12s but many of these "problems" mask concern about envi-
ronmental risk allocation or an impact on environmental philosophy.
Even if there is little public opposition, as long as there is any
legal challenge to a project, the project could be derailed and eco-
nomic waste may occur, if environmental risk allocation or environ-
mental philosophical values are affected. It is easy to suppose that
some judges, like the general public, appreciate the value of environ-
mental philosophy and risk allocation and may through NEPA delay,
prohibit, or seem hostile to a project for these reasons. Since these
values have not been explicitly recognized and considered under
NEPA, the basis of the judicial action may not be expressed forth-
rightly. Just as in cases of general opposition to government actions,
this "hidden" or "masked" judicial opposition prevents a project's
proponent from addressing or considering the true environmental
127. Michael A. Christofeno, Note, Psychological Distress Under NEPA, 19 VAL. U. L.
REv. 899, 923 (1985).
128. See ANDERSON Er AL., supra note 5, at 887-88 (noting various critical views of
NEPA's EIS process and of environmental impact statements themselves).
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costs, leading to frustration and expense in NEPA litigation. It also
incurs an indirect cost to the judiciary in terms of loss of institutional
respect. Directly acknowledging these values will help restore that in-
stitutional trust.
If environmental risk allocation and environmental philosophy
were explicitly considered under NEPA, then they could be addressed
at low cost. The proponents of an action would have a clearer under-
standing of what values would be affected by a project and whether
the project as presented or modified is viable, without the initial ex-
penditure of large sums of money to address phantom environmental
concerns. Even if environmental philosophical concerns or risk allo-
cation values were not immediately clear, they would come into focus
early in the project, allowing proper mitigation or abandonment of the
project at a far lower cost than now exists.
Environmental risk allocation and environmental philosophy are
the only major environmental values not to be considered under
NEPA. Though values other than environmental ones may be at play
in the use of NEPA,129 as these values are incorporated into the
NEPA decision-making process, the use of NEPA merely as a delay
tactic will decline. This will bring NEPA procedure more in line with
its legislative intent and will make the NEPA process more cost-
effective.
B. Consideration of These Values Will Make Environmental Review
More Consistent with Congressional and Societal Intent
In addition to making the NEPA process more efficient, a consid-
eration of required values should result in more desirable environ-
mental protection. Since NEPA requires consideration of
environmental impacts and since environmental philosophy and envi-
ronmental risk allocation are environmental values that may be af-
fected by governmental action, failure to consider them results in less
environmental protection than desired by Congress and presumably
by society who elected Congress. Once we begin to consider all of the
environmental impacts of government action, the Congress's (and pre-
sumably society's) desire to protect our environment will be more ac-
curately reflected in our physical world. 130  Environmental
129. For example, the Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) syndrome of non-environmental
cost allocation.
130. For instance, a recognition of environmental philosophy might provide the frame-
work for a consideration of the need to preserve species diversity rather than simply to
protect endangered species. See Gary D. Meyers, Old-Growth Forests, the Owl, and Yew:
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externalities deemed harmful by Congress will be internalized into
agency decisionmaking.
Environmentalists have long criticized the courts for not inter-
preting NEPA as having a definitive substantive component, arguing
that a procedural requirement is insufficient to effectuate the congres-
sional policy of protecting the environment. 131 However, if NEPA re-
quired consideration of environmental philosophical and risk
allocation values, this procedural/substantive dichotomy might evapo-
rate. If the procedure required an analysis of all of the important en-
vironmental values at risk, then a judicial "hard look" at the
procedural requirements might effectively approach the strength of a
substantive review.
C. Consideration of Environmental Philosophical Values Under NEPA
Provides Important Benefits External to the NEPA Process
(1) Consideration of Environmental Philosophy Under NEPA May Be
Needed to Create and Maintain Effective Voluntary
Environmental Protection
Ignoring the value and importance of environmental philosophy
in the NEPA context may undermine all environmental values in the
public eye. By not considering or acknowledging under NEPA a
"whole-earth" philosophy held dear by many parts of our society, we
tell our society that such a philosophy is not real, or that it is certainly
not valued in this context. Just as the failure to deal equitably with
racial issues by government officials appears to have often been asso-
ciated with a weakening of anti-discriminatory attitudes in the general
public,132 the failure to acknowledge and consider various environ-
mental values may contribute to their breakdown.
The failure to consider environmental philosophy may have dam-
aging consequences on our environment. A breakdown in existing en-
vironmental philosophy can lead those whose environmental
philosophical values have been eroded to actions inconsistent with this
philosophy. In most cases, such actions would then merely reflect eco-
Environmental Ethics Versus Traditional Dispute Resolution Under the Endangered Species
Act and Other Public Lands and Resources Laws, 18 B.C. ENvTL. Ai. L. REv. 623, 655-64
(1991).
131. See Timothy Patrick Brady, Comment, "But Most of It Belongs to Those Yet to be
Born'" The Public Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENvTL. Asi.
L. REv. 621, 637-40 (1990) (reviewing the line of cases that has led to NEPA's characteriza-
tion as a merely procedural statute); see also ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 845-47.
132. See Murray Dubin, "An Ugliness out There," Racial Attitudes: Do Polls Tell the
Truth?, SEATrLE TImsS, Mar. 11, 1990, at A17.
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nomic self-interest, discarding environmental care that is purely vol-
untary in nature. As noted by Carol Rose in her critique of market
control strategies: "Our acts and words convey varying messages
about what it means to 'do the right thing,' and in any given culture,
those words and messages may affect the way we use common
resources."133
Voluntary environmental compliance may be one of our society's
most effective mechanisms for controlling environmental degrada-
tion. 34 As stated by Daniel Farber, "the enforcement of a ban on
littering in the park can be expensive. It can be cost free-the eco-
nomically efficient result-if people refrain from littering because of
irrational environmental beliefs.' 135 Farber's example is supported by
empirical results. Littering, which used to be a national problem, has
changed greatly because of public perception and morality. Further-
more, the effects of failure to nurture an environmental philosophy
may not always be local. For instance, if the protection of a plant
species is deemed unimportant because there is no direct human eco-
nomic benefit, then it may seem less important for a given individual
not to trample on the fragile tundra in a national park or plant pre-
serve, and this action will be multiplied a million fold. "Micro" ac-
tions can have "macro" effects.
Environmental philosophy is also a moral force that helps make
the organization for environmental regulation possible. Many com-
mentators on environmental theory claim that, like the tragedy of the
commons, 136 if everyone acts in her own self-interest, there will be no
133. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 38 (1991); cf. John Braithwaite, The Limits of
Economism in Controlling Harmful Corporate Conduct, 16 LAW & Soc'y REv. 481, 489-90
(1981-82) (arguing that "[m]ost of us obey the law not because we are afraid of punishment
but simply because it seems the right thing to do. Society gets more protection from the
habit-forming value of law than from its deterrent value.").
134. Cf. Rose, supra note 133, at 34 (expressing concern that property rights strategies
"may come at the price of a diminution in a certain element of moral suasion. In turn, this
moral diminution may [create] a cultural climate in which one is not expected to do the
right thing unless it is in one's direct interest to do so.")
135. Plastic Trees, supra note 7, at 349; cf. Swenson, supra note 93, at 872 (discussing
the need for strong moral argument when the public is asked to forego a quality of life
increase from resource exploitation-"the balance on the scales of forbearance must weigh
heavily in favor of morality. Without a moral influence, society will oppose those activities
which are seen as detrimental to its advancement.").
136. The "Tragedy of the Commons," wherein no one takes care of common resources
because they have no economic incentive to do so, is sometimes accepted as the key to
understanding why "too much" environmental degradation occurs. ANDERSON Er AL.,
supra note 5, at 19.
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"organizing" to protect the environmental commons.137 Yet, we do
have organizing, and that is because of the existence of a common
philosophy to protect the environment as detailed in Part III. Envi-
ronmental philosophy may thus be the cornerstone of environmental
law and policy building. By damaging this philosophy through ne-
glect, we risk eroding any normative environmental standards we
have.
(2) Consideration of Environmental Philosophy under NEPA May Be
Needed to Nurture Other Philosophies and to Protect the
Human Psyche
The continued neglect of environmental philosophical values
under NEPA may have other undesirable effects beyond harm to our
"natural environment."
It has also been suggested that environmental philosophy is a re-
flection of other moral philosophies. According to Evelyn Shirk,
"[t]he environment is a recipient of our ethical choices regarding it
.... It reflects the moral quality of our acts... transmitting the moral
quality of my environmental choices to you and yours to me.' 38
For example, the choice of environmental domination instead of
accommodation or protection may be linked to, and may affect, other
forms of societal and personal domination.
Marcuse believes that domination in the social world is linked to the
domination of nature in such a way that the disappearance of one
form of domination requires the removal of the other. Behind this
idea lurks Hegel's dialectic of the master and the slave. Marcuse's
innovation is to cast nature in the role of the slave. In fact, Marcuse
sees the relation of human masters to human slaves as both a special
case of the mastery of nature and something which results from this
mastery. Hegel's master seeks self-identity through being reflected
by another, and attempts, unsatisfactorily, to achieve this by domi-
nating another. In the same way, suggests Marcuse, the masters of
nature seek to make nature reflect them-to make over nature in
the human image. But this attempt to conquer and subdue nature
has some undesirable consequences. First of all, because humans
themselves are a part of nature, the enslavement of nature tends to
lead to the enslavement of humans themselves by means of the
same science and technology that is used to conquer nature. And
secondly, the degradation of nature not only affects the prospects
137. See, e.g., James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARv. J.L. &
PuB. PoL'Y 325, 334-39 (1992) (arguing that when property is owned in common by a
community whose members are free to exploit its resources in the absence of a contrary
agreement, the negotiation of conservation agreements entails a prohibitively high cost to
their proponents).
138. Shirk, supra note 95, at 6.
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for human survival, but also diminishes human self-identity and
worth.' 39
In other words, according to philosophers, the desire to protect nature
can have far-reaching effects on the way in which we view other areas
of our existence and lives.
It is also possible that the failure to acknowledge these environ-
mental philosophical values may cause psychological damage as well
as loss of moral attitudes. It has been suggested that we are unable to
comprehend and process rapid changes in our environment and that
environmental philosophy slows down the pace of change.140 Just as
there was great cultural and individual suffering when technologically
advanced cultures came into contact with less technologically-ad-
vanced cultures, the incredibly rapid pace of our own technological
and resulting environmental changes will greatly tax our psychological
coping mechanisms. Environmental philosophy that seeks to preserve
the environment for its own sake may stabilize and slow this rate of
change. 141
A potentially more devastating effect of devaluing environmental
philosophy, but an effect not as clearly understood, is the loss of what
has been identified as the human "genetic" connection with nature.
Scientists have just begun to study what they perceive to be a genetic
predisposition in humans for savannah-like environments and the
sense of safety and security such environments may offer. Early re-
sults indicate that this connection, and presumably its benefits on the
human psyche, may be lost by failure to nourish and encourage this
identification. 142 Such a loss of connection and its effects may be diffi-
cult to measure in terms of psychological stress; but it remains a po-
tential harm from the failure to acknowledge and nurture human
values regarding humans' environmental surroundings. 143 Some have
suggested the genetic connection may be explained by the fact that the
contemplation of unaltered nature could relieve mental fatigue and
stress. 44 These benefits have only recently been explored, and it is
difficult to quantify the relationship between recognizing the value of
139. Janna L. Thompson, Preservation of Wilderness and the Good Life, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY 85, 99 (Robert Elliot & Arran Gare eds., 1983).
140. ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970).
141. See PETR BECKMANN, EcO-HYSTERICS AND THE TECHNOPHOBES 27-31 (1973)
(describing "future shock" and discussing various reactions to it).
142. Bill Dietrich, Is Our Love of Nature All in the Genes?, SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 4,
1994, at El.
143. Id.
144. Sherry Stripling, Nature's Calming Influence Measured, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 21,
1994, at El.
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environmental philosophy in NEPA, and the fostering of these values.
Nevertheless, these benefits should not be ignored in a thorough ex-
amination of this issue.
In summary, a consideration of environmental philosophy and
risk allocation values under NEPA would yield, many benefits, both
within the NEPA process itself and in other areas of society.
VII. How Such an Analysis Would Actually Work
Under NEPA
As an example of how these values could be considered and
would affect a NEPA analysis in a real-life project, consider the case
of the proposed development of the Early Winters Ski Resort in the
State of Washington. The factual background is set out in the Ninth
Circuit opinion on the appeal of the adequacy of the NEPA process
for the proposed land lease from the United States Forest Service. 145
Sandy Butte overlooks the Methow Valley, an unspoiled, sparsely
populated area on the eastern side of the North Cascade Mountains
in the State of Washington. The Methow Valley provides critical
winter range and migration corridors for Washington's largest mi-
gratory deer herd. Sandy Butte is a 3,900-acre parcel in the Oka-
nogan National Forest. The upper one-third of Sandy Butte is
entirely roadless. In 1978 appellee Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI)
applied for a "special use" permit to develop and operate a four-
season destination ski resort ohi Sandy Butte and a large parcel of
private land it had acquired adjacent to Sandy Butte. The proposed
development is known as the Early Winters project. The project is
expected to spawn extensive commercial and residential develop-
ment in the Methow Valley. Pursuant to requirements of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332,
mandating completion of an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) analyzing the environmental impacts of "major" governmen-
tal actions, the appellee Forest Service studied the question of
whether it should allocate Snady Butte for use as a downhill ski
area. In 1982 the Forest Service published a draft EIS on a proposal
to designate Sandy Butte for use as a major ski area capable of serv-
ing 8,200 skiers at one time (SAOT). The final EIS was issued in
1984. Based on its contents, in July 1984 the Regional Forester is-
sued a "Record of Decision" which adopted a "future management
plan" for Sandy Butte. The plan allocated the area for use as a ski
area capable of serving 8,200 SAOT. The record of decision also
approved the issuance of a special use permit to MRI for the Early
Winters Project.146
145. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810 (9th Cir.
1987), rev'd sub nom., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
146. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 833 F.2d at 811.
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The proposed ski resort had been investigated in a feasibility
study in 1970, but because of opposition from environmentalists and
attempts at negotiation, no action was taken by the Forest Service on
the special use permit until 1984.147 When the permit was finally
granted, the battle against Early Winters shifted to the federal courts.
Although there were several technical issues regarding NEPA review
that were litigated, the specific contentions regarding the adequacy of
the NEPA process after preparation of the Final Environmental Im-
pact Statement (FEIS) concerned the impact of such a large ski resort
on the migratory mule deer herd and on air quality.
The issues of the mule deer herd and air quality were litigated
from 1985 to 1989 all the way up to the United States Supreme Court,
but it seems unlikely that these impacts alone explained the great op-
position to the project or the sustained litigation and administrative
appeals that took so many years. First, the mule deer herd was sea-
sonally hunted, with baggings of about ten percent of the migratory
herd within a given year.148 The herd would not likely lose greater
numbers if the ski resort were to be developed. 49 There is an eco-
nomic benefit from hunting, but it is not likely to be any greater than
the economic benefit from a ski resort. As for the air quality issue, a
deterioration in air quality from development was expected regardless
of whether the ski resort was built. Indeed, the air controls suggested
in the mitigation document would actually improve air quality from
the no-action alternative. 50
Instead, it appears that these were the issues litigated and in-
volved in the administrative negotiation and appeals because they
provided the best mechanism to forestall the project, and eventually
appeal the granting of the permit. Those opposing the resort claimed
(with some justification in prior case law) that the Forest Service had
to construct a fail-safe mitigation plan for air quality and the mule
deer herd before action could be taken, and the Ninth Circuit agreed.
Although this was ultimately rejected as a requirement by the
147. Bill Dietrich, Ski Resort Plows Toward Reality, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, at
Bi; see Robertson, 490 U.S. at 337, 344-45.
148. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 342.
149. Id. at 342-43. The EIS recognized that the impact would be greater at times, such
as during fawning season, but reported that "mitigation measures" would minimize the
impact. Id. at 342 & n.7.
150. Id. at 339-40.
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Supreme Court, it provided a plausible objection that tied up action
on the project for more than ten years.151
If not mule deer or air quality, what were the concerns of the
citizens who opposed the resort? Why did they expend so much en-
ergy and money to oppose the project? Were the concerns purely
monetary? This seems unlikely since the ski resort would be expected
to increase the land values of all of those living in the valley.
I believe the concerns were environmentally related, but related
more to environmental risk allocation and environmental philosophy
than to the direct preservation of the mule deer herd or air quality.
If one imagines environmental philosophy as the desire to pre-
serve nature without human impact, it is easy to see the impact of this
project on the environmental philosophical values of the residents. As
stated by the Supreme Court, "[a]t present, Sandy Butte, like the
Methow Valley it overlooks, is an unspoiled, sparsely populated area
that the District Court characterized as 'pristine. ' " 5 2 In other words,
the Methow Valley is a unique area of natural beauty and grandeur,
and this may have led to the desire to protect it "in toto." Even if all
of the effects to animals and air were mitigated, a very large ski resort
would remain that would alter the natural appearance and dynamics
of the area, changing or even eliminating a natural tableau from which
people might draw strength and sustenance. In the candid words of
one resident, "[wie think the valley is much more of an asset as a
beautiful place to come and get away from it all, not in creating an-
other Disneyland."'1 53
The coercive aspect of the environmental risk allocation value is
also affected. At the level of development proposed by the Forest
Service, air quality impact mitigation would require limits on the
number of wood burning stoves, and the times they could be used.
Moreover, it would require new construction codes that, among other
things, would discourage the building of inexpensive summer cabins
(because of the requirement of full weatherization).5 4 All of these
mitigation measures would require people who already live or own
property in the area to bear some of the costs of reducing impacts
brought about by another party. Without the resort, passage of air
151. Id. at 353 & n.16.
152. Id. at 337.
153. Dietrich, supra note 142, at El.
154. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 340 & n.5.
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quality impact mitigation rules that would affect their behavior would
have been much less likely to occur.
If the values of environmental risk allocation and environmental
philosophy were incorporated into the NEPA analysis, then perhaps
these issues could have been satisfactorily addressed by the developer
of the resort. Instead of fielding appeals for ten years and preparing
numerous studies of the mule deer that were not really central to the
people's objections, causing vast expenditures of resources on both
sides and ultimately leading to the bankruptcy of the developer, the
developer could have considered the true objections. Perhaps the de-
veloper could have built a smaller development serving only 2000 ski-
ers, greatly lessening the impact on the natural surroundings, and
probably not requiring behavior coercing mitigation measures. In-
deed, during the litigation concerning the Early Winters Resort, the
nearby Sun Mountain Lodge cross-country ski resort opened and was
hailed as a model of an environmentally friendly ski resort.
Although the Methow Valley is indeed spectacular in its gran-
deur, it is not the only location in our country where people value
their natural surroundings or their independence. The concerns faced
by the citizens of the Methow Valley, concerns for their unspoiled
area and concerns for independence from coercive requirements, are
replicated thousands of times across this country. Presumably the in-
corporation of environmental risk allocation and environmental philo-
sophical values into NEPA would help address these concerns.
VII. Conclusion
Society is often in a state of confusion when projects are delayed
or stopped by public outcry based on some environmental "technical-
ity." We often accuse the public of being irrational. We must start
with the assumption that people are rational actors within our society.
It is simply that what is valuable and important to the public in the
environmental context, values concerning how they want their world
to be and how they prefer environmental risk to be allocated, are not
explicitly being considered.
The language and interpretation of NEPA require that environ-
mental risk allocation and environmental philosophy be considered in
the NEPA process. When this occurs, the process of enumerating the
environmental costs of a project will become more efficient, environ-
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mental protection desired by society will be more readily approxi-
mated, our formation and maintenance of environmental norms will
be improved, and we as a society will end up with results that better
coincide with our community values.

